var q greatideasofphilosophy2ndeditionPhilosophy from Greek, philosophia, literally love of wisdom is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as. Philosophy of Sexuality. Among the many topics explored by the philosophy of sexuality are procreation, contraception, celibacy, marriage, adultery, casual sex. BibMe Free Bibliography Citation Maker MLA, APA, Chicago, Harvard. Philosophy of Sexuality Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Among the many topics explored by the philosophy of sexuality are procreation, contraception, celibacy, marriage, adultery, casual sex, flirting, prostitution, homosexuality, masturbation, seduction, rape, sexual harassment, sadomasochism, pornography, bestiality, and pedophilia. What do all these things have in common All are related in various ways to the vast domain of human sexuality. That is, they are related, on the one hand, to the human desires and activities that involve the search for and attainment of sexual pleasure or satisfaction and, on the other hand, to the human desires and activities that involve the creation of new human beings. For it is a natural feature of human beings that certain sorts of behaviors and certain bodily organs are and can be employed either for pleasure or for reproduction, or for both. The philosophy of sexuality explores these topics both conceptually and normatively. Conceptual analysis is carried out in the philosophy of sexuality in order to clarify the fundamental notions of sexual desire and sexual activity. Conceptual analysis is also carried out in attempting to arrive at satisfactory definitions of adultery, prostitution, rape, pornography, and so forth. Conceptual analysis for example what are the distinctive features of a desire that make it sexual desire instead of something else In what ways does seduction differ from nonviolent rape is often difficult and seemingly picky, but proves rewarding in unanticipated and surprising ways. Normative philosophy of sexuality inquires about the value of sexual activity and sexual pleasure and of the various forms they take. Thus the philosophy of sexuality is concerned with the perennial questions of sexual morality and constitutes a large branch of applied ethics. Normative philosophy of sexuality investigates what contribution is made to the good or virtuous life by sexuality, and tries to determine what moral obligations we have to refrain from performing certain sexual acts and what moral permissions we have to engage in others. Some philosophers of sexuality carry out conceptual analysis and the study of sexual ethics separately. They believe that it is one thing to define a sexual phenomenon such as rape or adultery and quite another thing to evaluate it. Other philosophers of sexuality believe that a robust distinction between defining a sexual phenomenon and arriving at moral evaluations of it cannot be made, that analyses of sexual concepts and moral evaluations of sexual acts influence each other. Whether there actually is a tidy distinction between values and morals, on the one hand, and natural, social, or conceptual facts, on the other hand, is one of those fascinating, endlessly debated issues in philosophy, and is not limited to the philosophy of sexuality. Table of Contents Metaphysics of Sexuality Metaphysical Sexual Pessimism Metaphysical Sexual Optimism Moral Evaluations Nonmoral Evaluations The Dangers of Sex Sexual Perversion Sexual Perversion and Morality Aquinass Natural Law Nagels Secular Philosophy Fetishism Female Sexuality and Natural Law Debates in Sexual Ethics Natural Law vs. Liberal Ethics Consent Is Not Sufficient Consent Is Sufficient What Is Voluntary Conceptual Analysis Sexual Activity vs. Having Sex Sexual Activity and Sexual Pleasure Sexual Activity Without Pleasure References and Further Reading. Metaphysics of Sexuality. Our moral evaluations of sexual activity are bound to be affected by what we view the nature of the sexual impulse, or of sexual desire, to be in human beings. In this regard there is a deep divide between those philosophers that we might call the metaphysical sexual optimists and those we might call the metaphysical sexual pessimists. The pessimists in the philosophy of sexuality, such as St. Philosophy is the systematic study of the foundations of human knowledge with an emphasis on the conditions of its validity and finding answers to ultimate questions. Augustine, Immanuel Kant, and, sometimes, Sigmund Freud, perceive the sexual impulse and acting on it to be something nearly always, if not necessarily, unbefitting the dignity of the human person they see the essence and the results of the drive to be incompatible with more significant and lofty goals and aspirations of human existence they fear that the power and demands of the sexual impulse make it a danger to harmonious civilized life and they find in sexuality a severe threat not only to our proper relations with, and our moral treatment of, other persons, but also equally a threat to our own humanity. On the other side of the divide are the metaphysical sexual optimists Plato, in some of his works, sometimes Sigmund Freud, Bertrand Russell, and many contemporary philosophers who perceive nothing especially obnoxious in the sexual impulse. They view human sexuality as just another and mostly innocuous dimension of our existence as embodied or animal like creatures they judge that sexuality, which in some measure has been given to us by evolution, cannot but be conducive to our well being without detracting from our intellectual propensities and they praise rather than fear the power of an impulse that can lift us to various high forms of happiness. The particular sort of metaphysics of sex one believes will influence ones subsequent judgments about the value and role of sexuality in the good or virtuous life and about what sexual activities are morally wrong and which ones are morally permissible. Lets explore some of these implications. Metaphysical Sexual Pessimism. An extended version of metaphysical pessimism might make the following claims In virtue of the nature of sexual desire, a person who sexually desires another person objectifies that other person, both before and during sexual activity. Sex, says Kant, makes of the loved person an Object of appetite. Describes the memberships, activities and outings of this Durban club. Taken by itself it is a degradation of human nature Lectures on Ethics, p. Certain types of manipulation and deception seem required prior to engaging in sex with another person, or are so common as to appear part of the nature of the sexual experience. As Bernard Baumrim makes the point, sexual interaction is essentially manipulativephysically, psychologically, emotionally, and even intellectually Sexual Immorality Delineated, p. We go out of our way, for example, to make ourselves look more attractive and desirable to the other person than we really are, and we go to great lengths to conceal our defects. And when one person sexually desires another, the other persons body, his or her lips, thighs, toes, and buttocks are desired as the arousing parts they are, distinct from the person. The others genitals, too, are the object of our attention sexuality is not an inclination which one human being has for another as such, but is an inclination for the sex of another. Only her sex is the object of his desires Kant, Lectures, p. Further, the sexual act itself is peculiar, with its uncontrollable arousal, involuntary jerkings, and its yearning to master and consume the other persons body. During the act, a person both loses control of himself and loses regard for the humanity of the other. Our sexuality is a threat to the others personhood but the one who is in the grip of desire is also on the verge of losing his or her personhood. African Sage Philosophy Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Sage Philosophy Project began in the mid 1. Department of Philosophy of the University of Nairobi Kenya. At the University, Henry Odera Oruka 1. Sage Philosophy Project, and closely related terms such as philosophic sagacity, both by initiating a project of interviewing African sages, and by naming this project in a widely read popular article as the most promising of four trends of the relatively new field of African philosophy. This encyclopedia article focuses primarily on Oruka and his immediate sources of inspiration, and then includes others whose projects share similar methodologies and goals. Although the definition of the key terms is not always completely uniform, at the heart of this approach to African philosophy lies the emphasis on academically trained philosophy students and professors interviewing non academic wise persons whom Oruka called sages, and then engaging philosophically with the interview material. Oruka usually but not always emphasized keeping the identity of the individual sage well known. He also insisted that it was the sage who knew the traditions of his or her ethnic group the best, and who would be able to have critical distance to evaluate and sometimes reject prevailing beliefs and practices. The goals of collecting the interviews and evaluating them have been articulated in Orukas many works. The first goal was to help construct texts of indigenous African philosophies. Before Orukas project there was a dearth of existing texts and a need to record indigenous ideas, both for posterity that is, for a sense of identity and for historical reasons and for the present and future. African wisdom that had been marginalized by academia, and by city life, could provide valuable solutions to contemporaneous problems in Africa. Such texts of interviews could also sustain intellectual curiosity and provide practical guidance or phronesis. Oruka searched for sages and wanted a wider public to know not only their words written down in transcripts but also about their lives. For him, a sages worth was not only in their ideas but also in the way they live by embodying their philosophies, developing their character, and affecting their communities over the years. After all, the sages in Kenya operate in contexts of social conflict and exploitation. Sages are those from whom others seek moral and metaphysical advice and consultation on issues involving moral and psychological attitudes and judgments. Oruka looked to the term japaro in Luo, meaning thinker, to approximate the translation of sage. The term japaro is closely related to jang ad rieko which means professional advisor. He emphasized that people would single out sages for advice on even the most delicate matters. Table of Contents. Oruka Biography and Early Writings. Sage Philosophy in Philosophical Context. Beginning Interviews in Kenya. Relationship to the Hallen Sodipo Study. Folk Sages and Philosophic Sages. Criticisms of Sage Philosophy. Culture Philosophy and Its Relationship to Philosophic Sages. Orukas Sage Philosophy the Last Few Years. Sage Philosophy Research by Other Philosophers Students. Sage Philosophy Research by Other Philosophers Other Scholars. References and Further Reading. Oruka Biography and Early Writings. The history of the project begins in the 1. It is also important to know something about Orukas academic training and background, and the skills and interests he brought to the project. Oruka grew up surrounded by sages in his home area of Ugenya, in the Nyanza Province of Kenya, and as a youth he looked up to them and learned much wisdom from them. Graduating from St. Marys High School in Yala, he won a scholarship to study geography at Uppsala University in Sweden. While there, Oruka was influenced by philosophy Professor Ingemar Hedenius to follow his newly developing interests and study philosophy instead. Philosophy studies at Uppsala were divided into two tracks, Practical and Theoretical, and Oruka specialized in Practical Philosophy Applied Ethics and Political Philosophy. The approach to philosophy Oruka learned both in Sweden and later at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan, was greatly influenced by the logical empiricists. Indeed, Oruka referred to himself an empiricist as well Practical 2. He would later remark that this narrow emphasis on analytic philosophy that he received in his formal training was an initial handicap to his ability to enter the debates on African philosophy upon his return to Kenya Oruka, Trends 1. When he returned to Kenya in 1. Oruka became one of the first two African philosophy faculty members at University of Nairobi. At that time, many departments at the University of Nairobi UON were questioning the Eurocentric curriculum that was their colonial heritage. Ngugi wa Thiongo, Okot pBitek, and Taban Lo Liyong were some of the scholars challenging the curriculum in literature, development studies, and other areas Ogot. The Institute for African Studies at UON was founded in 1. Sage philosophy was an attempt to rise to the challenge of imagining an approach to philosophy that focused on African ideas and realities. The fields of literature and history had turned to oral sources there was no reason that philosophy could not do the same. When Oruka received his first full time position in 1. African Philosophy was dominated by Placide Tempels, John Mbiti, and other early scholars who sometimes blurred the line between religious and philosophical thinking. Also, at that time, the Philosophy and Religious Studies departments at UON were merged. Having studied with Hedenius, famous for his arguments in favor of atheism, Oruka distinguished himself with early essays in 1. African philosophy as no more than dressed up mythical thinking. He later judged these articles as youthful as well as simplistic and unnecessarily offensive Oruka, Trends 1. Practical 2. 85 Graness and Kresse 1. He championed a secular and logical approach to lifes big questions. However, also impressed by the need to appreciate an unfairly marginalized, substantial body of thought coming from Africa, Oruka proposed his sage philosophy project as a way to provide missing information about African ideas and values. He was convinced that rural sages were not merely religious figures but thinkers who used their own rational powers to develop insights, and who could explain their reasoning to others. In his early 1. 97. Mythologies as African Philosophy Oruka was to insist on jettisoning traditions harmful to Africas present and future. He criticized both Placide Tempels book Bantu Philosophy and John Mbitis book African Religions and Philosophy as backward looking champions of absolutely unphilosophical African traditions. He agreed with Fanons criticism of a certain type of misguided African intellectual who falsely builds up the greatness of African tradition in a futile attempt to convince Europeans that African culture is as good as theirs. Oruka wanted instead to write for an African audience Oruka in Graness and Kresse Sagacious 1. In Mythologies, Oruka began to articulate his emphasis on the need to acknowledge individual thinkers. By anonymizing everyone and providing only group consensus, Tempels, Mbiti, and W.